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C e n tra l

Dialectic and Definition in Aristotle's Topics'
The middle term between dialectic and being is definition. Dialectic as an interrogative procedure
(155b8) that employs likeness and difference (105a20-108b36) secures definitions (108b8, 20). Definitions
are, fundamentally, formulae of essences (10lb37, 1030a6-1031al4). Substance, then, is what is most
definable. But one's view of substance will depend, therefore, on one's view of definition: what a definition
is, and how it is acquired. Further, so far as definitions are arrived at through dialectic, one's view of
definition will depend on dialectic. That is, the specific procedure of dialectic shapes the mode of definition,
and the mode of definition shapes the notion of being. Not only does dialectic shape being through
definition, but being, and also what is knowable about being, i.e., its essence and definition which captures
this essence, also determines dialectic for being is the object with which dialectic deals. In short, these three
things go together: dialectic, definition, being. The task of my paper is to explore this nexus and reveal the
essence of Aristotle's philosophical dialectic.
Section I of my paper focuses on Book I of the Topics to show the intimate connections between
dialectic, definition, and being and hence the contribution of the Topics to metaphysics and objective reality.
Section II shows that in general, the remaining seven Books of the Topics support the thesis in Section I.
Section III takes the connections of dialectic, definition and being further by showing a different kind of
common opinion, a more primitive one made up of the topoi which allow Aristotle a non-circular way of
getting at reality via his dialectical method.
Section I
This essay is significant because if my interpretation about the interconnection of dialectic, definition
and being is correct, then Aristotle's dialectical methodology has heretofore been severely undermined. To
assume as G.E.L. Owen in his "Titenai ta phainomena"*2 and T. Irwin in his analyses of both pure and strong
dialectic in his Aristotle's First Principles, that dialectic, unlike demonstration, is not intrinsically connected
to reality or observable facts, only raises doubts and problems about ever discovering objective truth or reality
with this method. Others who might be more sympathetic with Aristotle's dialectic stress its usefulness to
philosophical understanding when the knot from which it proceeds gets untied. However, the claim that
Aristotle's dialectic is only useful because the aporia it employs forms the driving force of philosophical
thinking, i.e., the lusis or unravelling of an aporia gives knowledge or insight, undermines the substantive
contribution of dialectic to (i) our knowledge of the truth of being, and (ii) choice and avoidance in actions
(104b 1-3). Commentators such as Gilbert Ryle3 and John J. Cleary4 fall into such a camp of thinkers who

‘Please note that this is only a first draft. Please send comments to Philmhs@vml.ucc.okstate.edu or to May
Sim, Department of Philosophy, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, OK 74078. Many thanks!
2G.E.L. Owen "Tithenai ta phainomena" in New Essays on Plato and Aristotle, ed., R. Bambrough, The
Humanities Press, N.Y., (1965).
3Gilbert Ryle "Dialectic in the Academy." (ibid).
4John J. Cleary "Working Through Puzzles with Aristotle," The Journal o f Neoplatonic Studies, vol. 1. No. II.
I agree with Cleary's recognition that Aristotle's account of dialectic in his Metaphysics corresponds to his account of
it in the Topics. However, our accounts differ in the following ways. Whilst he stresses the dialectical procedure (viz.
his four stages for an adequate dialectical proof), and how the solution of the aporia preserves the truth of the most
reputable opinions, I stress the metaphysical foundation of the dialectical procedure and such a foundation of the
common opinions—i.e., the intimate relation between dialectic and being so that the concern of dialectic is not simply
with the preservation of the most reputable opinions.
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focus on the lusis of an aporia but ultimately undermine the true contribution of Aristotle's dialectic.
Despite Irwin's initial separation of dialectic from being, unlike Owen who rests content with the lack
o f objectivity, and unlike those interpreters who focus on the 'pedagogic' advantages o f dialectic, he tries to
explain how Aristotle's dialectic can attain objective reality. He attempts to show that Aristotle's dialectical
method, though beginning from common beliefs, could proceed selectively from these common beliefs in his
first philosophy to actually arrive at objective arguments for his first principles. Dialectic then, helps support
Aristotle's realist metaphysics rather than first principles which merely cohere with common opinions (viz.
Irwin, 19). Despite my agreement with Irwin's attempt to provide a defense of the objectivity of Aristotle's
dialectic, and hence the objectivity of the disciplines/fields that are dependent on such dialectical methods,
I disagree with the way that Irwin goes about it.
Irwin's method is to distinguish between 'strong dialectic' which he attributes to Aristotle's later works
such as the Metaphysics and 'weak' or 'pure dialectic' which he attributes to Aristotle's earlier works such as
the Topics. The difference according to Irwin between pure and strong dialectic is as follows. The former
proceeds from common beliefs which the interlocutor is free to accept or reject, and aims only to achieve
coherence amongst the common beliefs. The latter, though beginning from common beliefs, selects those
beliefs which are based on the reality established in the Metaphysics. Consequently, to reject these selected
beliefs would entail rejecting the explanation and understanding of reality provided by the Metaphysics.
Irwin also maintains that strong dialectic aims not at coherence amongst common beliefs but rather at
objective first principles. I disagree with Irwin's distinction between 'pure* and 'strong' dialectic. I will raise
doubts about Irwin's distinction by showing that the Topics, one of the earlier works using pure dialectic
according to Irwin, exemplifies the kind of dialectic he attributes to Aristotle's later works, the Metaphysics
being an instance of the later works. By raising doubts about Irwin's attribution of pure or weak dialectic to
the Topics, the following will result: (i) it is false that works such as the Topics or Organon lead merely to
coherence of common beliefs and not to objective first principles, (ii) it is false that there is a clear break
between Aristotle's earlier and later works with regard to the dialectical method, and (iii) dialectic has always
aimed at objective first principles and reality whether it accomplishes such a purpose or not. By this last
point, I mean that the same method could have been practiced without guarantee that Aristotle had exhausted
his investigations so that he was able to arrive at the results that dialectic is capable of attaining. Hence one
could maintain that there is a difference in accomplishments, for instance, between the Metaphysics and the
Categories, while maintaining that they used the same method.
Aristotle's dialectic leads to an investigation of 'what substance is' or being qua being, i.e., first
philosophy. To ultimately understand the connection between dialectic and first philosophy, let us first look
at Aristotle's definition of dialectic. As he puts it, "reasoning, on the other hand, is 'dialectical,' if it reasons
from opinions that are generally accepted" (100a30-31). Since Aristotle here contrasts dialectical reasoning,
which proceeds from common opinions, with demonstration, which proceeds from true and primary premises,
which premises are supported by the "things themselves," it seems easy to suppose that dialectic here (or what
Irwin calls 'pure' dialectic) cannot get us to objective first principles. Irwin's way out of this weakness of
dialectic is to separate out a pure dialectic from strong dialectic. He holds that pure dialectic rests entirely
on common opinions which aim at a systematic and coherent account of common beliefs (Irwin, 466), whilst
strong dialectic rests on premises which we are not free to reject. We are not free to reject the opinions of
strong dialectic for they rest on premises which correspond to an independent reality such that our rejection
of them would lead us to lose the explanation and understanding that rest on Aristotle's Metaphysics (viz.
Irwin, 466-467).
I will show that the Topics already supports what Irwin calls 'strong' dialectic so that his attribution
of pure dialectic to the Topics is untenable. In short, I will show that the Aristotelian propositions/problems
for dialectical arguments/reasonings in the Topics cannot be rejected freely. The reason one cannot reject
these propositions are the following: (i) one would be giving up the very possibility o f argument or reasoning
since these problems or propositions are the subject matter of any reasoning whatsoever; and (ii) one would
also be giving up the very being that is achieved through the dialectical method, which being in turn has
2

determined the method.
Irwin's distinction between pure and strong dialectic is mistaken because he fails to recognize the
intimate connection between dialectic and being. Such a failure is exhibited in his willingness to separate
(pure) dialectic from being, making it possible for the persons involved in the argument to freely reject any
opinion. His attempt then to link dialectic and being in the Metaphysics seems to divorce dialectic from its
foundation on common beliefs in order to achieve objectivity. The divorce of dialectic from common beliefs
comes when he bases the objectivity of such a dialectic on thq Metaphysics so that it is no longer the common
beliefs that support the ensuing arguments (viz. 467). However, if objectivity is attained thus for Irwin, it
comes at the expense of giving up dialectic, i.e., the beginning from endoxa. Consequently, Irwin never quite
succeeds in convincing us that Aristotle's dialectic is philosophical and that it could achieve objective first
principles.
My essay on the other hand, will show that the dialectical method spelled out in the Topics is already
philosophical and hence metaphysical so that one does not need to wait for the Metaphysics (if indeed it is
later). However, to say that dialectic in the Topics is already philosophical is not to say that it attains or
fulfills its philosophical enterprise. It is perfectly consistent to say that the Topics is philosophical and has
the same philosophical potential as the Metaphysics, without the Topics having to bring to full fruition its
potential.
The first piece of evidence for the objectivity of dialectic in the Topics is that while setting up the
materials for dialectical arguments, Aristotle starts with the subjects about which we reason. He says that the
arguments are "equal in number" and "identical with the subjects, on which reasoning5 take place" (101b1315). If the materials of dialectical arguments or reasonings are the same as the subjects of reasonings, then
dialectical arguments or reasonings deal with the same reality as reasonings. So just as our reasonings are
true or false depending on whether they capture the reality at which they are directed,6 so too there is
correctness/wrongness and truth/falsity to dialectical reasonings or arguments. The standards of truth and
correctness stem from the fact that dialectical arguments/reasonings are about the same objects as those of
reasonings, which objects for Aristotle determine the truth and correctness of dialectical propositions. Hence,
despite the fact that dialectical reasoning "reasons from opinions that are generally accepted" (100a30-31),
due to the objectivity of its subject matter, the opinions from which it reasons are either true or false, correct
or incorrect, depending on whether these opinions correctly capture reality. Sifting through common opinions
and establishing the correct ones would then enable one using dialectic to achieve truth in her reasonings or
arguments. As I have mentioned above, Aristotle distinguishes demonstrative from dialectical reasoning.
Given that I am linking dialectic to objective reality, one might ask if I am not conflating two kinds of
reasoning Aristotle distinguishes? Though I hold that dialectic, like demonstration, rests on reality, there is
a difference between them and this difference lies in their respective beginning. Whilst demonstration starts
from premises that are true and primary, dialectic starts from common beliefs that are closer to us. These
common beliefs of dialectic could be examined, and if found untrue, discarded and true ones substituted in
order that one arrives at a truth that is absolute and further removed from us (viz. 982a24-26).7

5By "reasoning” Aristotle means "an argument in which, certain things being laid down, something other than
these necessarily comes about through them." (100a25-27). He then divides such reasoning into demonstration on the
one hand, and dialectic on the other.
6See Nicomachean Ethics VI. 1 where reasoning is divided into speculative and deliberative. The former is true
or false whilst the latter is correct or incorrect.
7In Section III, I will show that there is another more primitive kind of common opinion which consists in the

topoi Aristotle uses. By describing these topoi as primitive common opinions I mean to convey their fundamentality
and all pervasiveness to our thinking about reality. These are indeed common opinions {endoxa) in that they are
inseparable from our perception of reality due to their being aspects of reality. Contrary to the more developed opinions
3
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That Aristotle believes in the objectivity of the outcome of dialectic is apparent in the following. In
Book 1.18 o f the Topics, Aristotle speaks about the usefulness to clarity of examining the various meanings
of a term. Such an examination ensures that "our reasonings shall be in accordance with the actual facts and
not addressed merely to the term used" (108a 17-22). In Book 1.11, he speaks of the contribution of dialectic
to "choice and avoidance, or to truth and knowledge" (104b2). Last but not least, dialectical propositions or
problems are constituted by definitions and definitions capture a thing's essence (101b38). Hence, by
procuring the right propositions or problems through correct definitions, the outcome o f dialectical reasonings
would also be objective. This means that dialectic is able to provide us with truth and knowledge about
reality rather than a bunch of opinions which merely cohere.
Given the significance of the reality of dialectic, what then is this reality? Aristotle begins answering
this crucial question in Book 1.4 of the Topics. He holds that dialectical arguments begin with propositions8
or problems (10 lb 15, 104a3-4), and reasonings reason about problems. However, propositions and problems
are similar in that they are constituted by the following four elements. Namely, the elements are a property,
or a definition, or a genus, or an accident. It is noteworthy that the four elements together, i.e., in some
combination, rather than each taken by itself, constitute propositions or problems. The significance of this
point for Aristotle is that definition is the focus of all these elements so that directly or indirectly, even the
elements apart from definition, tell us about definition (viz. Topics 1.6).
Let me first elaborate on these four elements which constitute the propositions and problems of
dialectical reasoning and the problems of reasoning. These four are extremely important elements because
they contribute to our understanding of 'what something is', be the thing in question a substance or essence,
or any of the other nine categories of quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, activity, and
passivity (viz. Topics 1.9 103b23-24).
Aristotle maintains that every proposition and problem tells us about a genus, or a peculiarity, or an
accident. What is peculiar is in turn divisible into that which tells us something's essence and hence is a
definition; and that which does not tell us the thing's essence though it belongs to the thing alone. This latter
is called a property. Both a definition and a property are predicated convertibly of the thing (viz. Posterior
Analytics 1.22, 83a23-24, Topics 102al8-20). An example of the convertibility of the subject and predicate
of a definition is: a man is a rational animal and a rational animal is a man. An example of the convertibility
o f the subject and predicate of a property is the property of learning grammar and man. Aristotle says, "...if
A be a man, then he is capable of learning grammar, and if he be capable of learning grammar, he is a man"
(102a20-21). These two elements, i.e., a definition and a property constitute in part the kind o f materials from
which dialectical reasonings start. For instance, the definition of man can constitute a dialectical proposition

that are open to arguments and to the possibility of being rejected, these topoi are the very ways to arguments and are
never themselves open to be argued about. Similarity and difference for instance is one such topos which essential work
in establishing reality we will see in this Section. The reason such a topos is so essential to establishing reality is that
reality is constituted by sameness and difference. These topoi that make up our primitive opinions differ from the
premises of demonstrations in that they are not yet premises but the materials from which premises could be generated.
They are similar to the premises in so far as these topoi too are true and primaiy.
8Aristotle says, "For arguments start with 'propositions,' while the subjects on which reasonings take place are
'problems' (101b 15-16). Even though Aristotle distinguishes propositions from problems, the distinction is not relevant
to the aspect of dialectic of which I am discussing because I am only dealing with the materials of dialectic and Aristotle
includes both propositions and problems as the materials of dialectical inquiry (viz. 104a3-4). The difference between
propositions and problems is simply a turn of phrase—the former proposes a thesis and immediately asks for an assent
or dissent whilst the latter incorporates the thesis into the question. Aristotle's example of a proposition is as follows:
"'An animal that walks on two feet" is the definition of man, is it not?' (Notice the assertion followed immediately by
the question here). His example of a problem about the same subject is: 'Is "an animal that walks on two feet" a
definition of man or no?' (Notice the incorporation of the assertion into the question from the beginning here).
4

as follows: "'An animal that walks on two feet" is the definition of man, is it not?' (101b30) Whether such
a proposition is examined dialectically then depends on whether the thesis involved is one that is puzzling
to those who need argument (105a2-4, viz. 104a3ff or chapter 10). More will be said about the contribution
of puzzles to dialectic in first philosophy for Aristotle later.
A genus is another one of the four elements which contributes to our understanding of 'what
something is'; it is a predicate in the category of substance/essence. Aristotle's example is that by predicating
"animal" of man and of ox, we are arguing that they are in the same genus. Such a proposition contributes
to dialectical arguments because if we could show that "animal" is "the genus of the one but not of the other,
we shall have argued that these things are not in the same genus;" (102b 1-3) and hence come to better know
what each is.
Finally, Aristotle defines an "accident" as "something which may possibly either belong or
not belong to any one and the self-same thing, as (e.g.) the 'sitting posture' may belong or not belong to some
self-same thing" (102b4-7). An accidental predicate, like the previous three, contributes to dialectical
reasoning because the recognition that such a predicate is not necessarily predicated of a thing allows one to
see the falsity in an opinion which attempts to make a universal proposition from such an accidental
predication. Finally, by knowing that an accidental predicate may or may not belong to something also
contributes to our knowledge of what a thing is.
Knowledge of the definition of a thing,(a knowledge to which all four elements discussed contribute)
is crucial because Aristotle stresses time and again that people cannot argue dialectically unless they are
directed at the same thing or the actual fact ( Topics 1.18, 108al7-23, 105a31-33). Given that to know
whether interlocutors are directed at the same thing depends upon knowing the essence of the thing, which
knowledge is provided by the four elements, Aristotle holds that these four elements are the sources or
materials of all dialectical arguments or reasonings. It is clear how the definition helps us know the essence
of a thing. But the other three elements, namely, the genus, property, and accident also contribute to our
grasp o f the definition because they can destroy the definition if the propositions they make up are proven
otherwise. As Aristotle puts it,
We must not fail to observe that all remarks made in criticism of a 'property' and 'genus' and
'accident' will be applicable to 'definition' as well. For when we have shown that the attribute
in question fails to belong only to the term defined, as we do also in the case of a property,
or that the genus rendered in the definition is not the true genus, or that any of the things
mentioned in the phrase used does not belong, as would be remarked also in the case of an
accident, we shall have demolished the definition; so that, to use the phrase previously
employed, all the points we have enumerated might in a certain sense be called 'definitory'
{Topics, 1.6,102b27-35)
The lesson to be gathered from Aristotle's discussion of the contribution of the four elements to the
propositions or problems of dialectic is that dialectic gets its materials from being itself and other aspects of
being—namely, its genus, property, accident, and definition. The being that is revealed in the Topics is an
objective reality that is accessible to us. In a sense, it has already been revealed to be an objective reality by
Aristotle's stress on the four elements which capture this reality. Aristotle's talk of definition which captures
the essence or the 'what it is' of something shows that there are things with essences in the world. For
instance, he tells us that the investigation of sameness and difference helps us define things and recognize
what a particular thing is (viz. 108a36-108b25). Given that the genus captures the sameness of different
objects, it too contributes to the definition. By the same token, insofar as recognizing the differentia proper
to a thing (108b6) entails recognizing the things that are peculiar but not essential (i.e., properties) and those
that are accidental, again the other three elements are directly or indirectly definitory. Not only is the
objective reality from which dialectic gets its materials apparent from Aristotle's talk about the four elements,
but that dialectic, could reach and deal with this reality is also revealed in this discussion. By examining the
predicates that tell us what something is, and distinguishing such predicates from those which might seem
5

to tell us what something is but really just capture the thing's properties or accidents, dialectic is the procedure
that distinguishes for us a thing's essence and its inessential aspects. Once we know a thing's essence, through
investigations of sameness and difference, we can then go on to categorize this thing with, or separate it from,
others, and come to know more about its other aspects.
The further fact that Aristotle is not just dealing with words or opinions without an objective reality
is evident when time and again he tells us to get clear about the various senses a term might be used so that
we are clear about the various aspects of reality, or what he calls the "differences of things" (105a33), to
which the same term might be applied. Clarifying these sameness and difference will ensure that we are
directing our minds at "actual facts" (108a21) or at "the same thing" (108a23). In fact the whole of Book 1.15
of the Topics consists in different ways of examining if a term has several meanings or one. His examples
here attest to the fact that if a term has several meanings, it is mostly due to its application to various realities,
e.g., 'to have sense' has more than one meaning when applied to body and soul respectively (106b21-25).
Further, 'clear' and 'obscure' mean differently when applied to sound and colour (106a24-28). The dialectical
investigation of sameness and difference then is one that gives us the definitions of things and hence gives
us beings that are objective due to the objective sameness and difference these definitions capture. At the
same time, dialectic for Aristotle proceeds in the way it does, examining sameness and difference, employing
the four elements because being itself is so structured that there are sameness and difference exhibited by
these four aspects.9 Hence the dialectical procedure of (i) focusing on definitions which capture essences,
genera, properties, and accidents; (ii) looking to sameness and difference to ascertain whether we are dealing
with the same thing or different things; and (iii) looking at the various senses of a term (again using sameness
and difference) to ensure that we are using the same sense and hence directing our minds at the same thing;
are all ways which are determined by the things in the world, by their various aspects, and by their relations
with other things.
By showing the objectivity of the reality which forms the material or subject matter of Aristotelian
dialectic, we see then that dialectic in the Topics already proceeds from common opinions that are based in
reality and hence they cannot be rejected without risking the possibility of giving up intelligible arguments
or being. The possibility of intelligible arguments would be risked if one rejects correct dialectical
propositions freely because one would end up not being able to argue at all, not having any subject matter
about which to argue. Given that dialectic gives us being through definition and hence helps make reality
intelligible, we would also be giving up such an intelligible reality if we just rejected correct dialectical
propositions freely.
Having shown the interdependence of dialectic and being through analyzing Aristotle's view of
definition in the Topics, it now remains for me to show that dialectic is intrinsically philosophical or
metaphysical. Recall that Aristotle's claim is that "Not every problem, nor every thesis, should be examined,
but only one which might puzzle one of those who need argument..." (105a2-4, cf. 1006a6-10). Given that
we could get definitions capturing the essences not only in the categoiy of substance, but also in the other
nine categories of quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, activity, and passivity, one of the
puzzles that arises concerns "what is primary amongst these essences?" Questions regarding the primacy of
substance or essence and questions such as "What is being?" and "Is being one or many?" arise as puzzles
not only from Aristotle's own dialectic leading to definitions in the ten categories, but also from Aristotle's
predecessors' arguments (viz. Met. 1.3-10) supporting both the oneness and plurality of being. Given that the
dialectic procedure is one that investigates these puzzles through investigating sameness and difference,
priority and posteriority, motion and rest, the sensible and non-sensible, etc. (viz. Met. III. 1, 995b5-26), it is
intrinsic to this method to deal with the subject matter of being qua being, i.e., the question of first philosophy

9
Viz. Topics 1.7 where Aristotle discussed the various senses of 'sameness' which senses correspond to the
structure of being, i.e., being that is categorized by predicating of it its genus and species etc (cf. VI.4, VI.7,146a3- 13,
21-33, VI.13-14, 150al5-22, VIL 1, 151b28-152b35).
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(viz. Met. IV.2). The investigation of being qua being would lead to what primaiy substance or essence is
because it is the primary that is knowable and upon which all else depends for their names (viz. Met.
1003M6-17, cf. 1003b31-33 taken with 1004all-28).
Dialectic then, is philosophical because it proceeds from common opinions about reality, which
common opinions attempt to capture the definitions of reality. Such definitions however go on to constitute
propositions or problems that are puzzling due to the convincing and yet conflicting ways in which one's
predecessors have argued about what is real. Since it is the task of metaphysics to study being qua being, i.e.,
what is essentially being, and dialectic provides the materials and ways to study being, dialectic is essentially
metaphysical and philosophical in the sense that it studies first philosophy.
In Section I, I have focused on Book I of the Topics to show that dialectic aims at definitions and
definitions capture the essences of things in the world. Such a task was accomplished by looking at the
connectedness between the four elements of a property, a definition, a genus and an accident; especially the
relevance of each of these elements for the discovery of the definition. At this point, it is important that I
show in Section II that the remaining seven books of the Topics support the significant role played by
definition and being in Aristotle's dialectic. In Section III, I will show that the topoi in these remaining seven
Books also provide the tools which allow Aristotle to achieve definitions of essences in a non-question
begging way. The reason for this latter argument is that an opponent to my view might, at this point, say that
I'm simply using Aristotle's own definition of substance and definition in the Metaphysics to establish that
such a definition gets at substance or being. It might also seem that I'm relying too much on th q Metaphysics
to provide me with the foundation to being and hence, there might not be such a great difference between
Irwin's view and mine. So what I will try to show is that the topics which Aristotle discusses in the rest of
the seven chapters of the Topics provide him with the ways to determine a genus, a property, an accident, and
a definition. I have already alluded to one of these topoi, namely, that of sameness and difference earlier on.
But I shall show how some others of the many hundreds of topón work as independent means to determining
each of these four elements as well as how they are the bases upon which these four elements rest.
Section II
At first glance, the structure of the rest of the seven Books of the Topics seems to support my claim
regarding the focus of this treatise on definition and being. For instance, Book II of the Topics talks about
accidents. Not only does this chapter deal with ways of investigating into whether an accident is correctly
predicated of a subject, it starts out by discussing the difficulty of conversions with respect to accidental
predications and how such conversions must be "based on the definition, and the property, and the genus."
(108b 13) Such a distinction between conversions in accidental predication and those predications of
definition, property and genus supports the differences Aristotle establishes between accidents and the other
four elements which ultimately help in the determination of definitions. Book III of the Topics on the other
hand, does not seem at first sight to support any of the four elements, especially definitions, for it deals with
comparisons between two or more closely related things and the showing of the superiority of one over the
other(s) and hence its choiceworthiness. Nevertheless, this Book too is intimately bound up with definition
and being for it lays bare the superiority of things such as peculiarity over commonality (117b30), and the
superiority of things gotten from his discussions of the greater and the less (119b 16ff) and the good and the
bad (1 19b30ff) when applied to genera. These comparisons and standards or rules for determining which if
two (or more) things is indeed more choiceworthy allows us to understand why a particular quality is selected
as the differentia and another selected as the genus for these are the qualities that are more important or more
choiceworthy absolutely. Most importantly, I see Book III as the foundation of Aristotle's criteria in his
ethical works and his Metaphysics for it reveals the way to the determination of the hierarchy of goods.
Books IV and V of the Topics explicitly support my reading and discussion thus far that definition is the focal
point of Aristotle's discussions about these four elements for he mentions that a genus and a property are
elements which relate to definitions. As Aristotle puts it in the opening sentences of Book IV, "The next
7

questions which we must examine are those which relate to genus and property. These are elements in
questions relating to definitions, but in themselves are seldom the subject of inquiries by disputants."
(120b 12-15) Books VI and VII too, since they are devoted to the discussion of definitions again support my
reading that the Topics is directed at the investigations of being and definitions. It is noteworthy that Aristotle
devotes two Books to the discussion of definition which is a good indication that definition plays an important
role in dialectic.
Book VIII of the Topics at first sight seems not to support my reading that the Topics is directed at
definition and being and that dialectic is always already philosophical in this search for being. This is because
it starts out with a comparison and contrast between the philosopher and the dialectician. He says, "(a)s far
as the choice of ground (topou) goes, the philosopher and the dialectician are making a similar inquiry, but
the subsequent arrangement of material and the framing of questions are the peculiar province of the
dialectician; for such a proceeding always involves a relation with another party," (155b7ff) whilst the
philosopher is not as interested about directing his materials at another. Given such a claim, and that Aristotle
goes on to discuss the formulation or arrangement of materials and roles played by the questioner and the
answerer (chapters 1-8), one can see why certain interpreters claim that the Topics is simply a handbook of
strategies for the dialectician and that the dialectician is to be sharply distinguished from the philosopher.10
Nonetheless, even in this Book, despite the appearance that it is directed at the dialectician, deals significantly
with how philosophers proceed, the role played by definitions and the definability of first principles, and
ultimately, with the significance of such procedures for philosophical knowledge and wisdom.
Since Aristotle maintains three uses of dialectic, we need to ask if these different uses of dialectic
affect his distinction between the philosopher and the dialectician. More specifically, the three uses of
dialectic that Aristotle recognizes are as follows: dialectic—for the sake of mental training (pros gumnasiari),
for the sake of conversations or public encounters (pros tas enteuseis) and for the sake of philosophic sciences
(pros tas kata philosophian). Since there are three uses of dialectic, it isn't clear that he is referring to
philosophical dialectic when he says something about dialectic. Hence, with respect to the above contrast
between the philosopher and the dialectician, he could very well be contrasting the philosopher (dialectician)
with those who employ dialectic for public encounters and for mental training so that whilst the other two
kinds o f dialecticians concern themselves with an other interlocutor, the philosopher dialectician does not.
Taking Aristotle's own advice in this treatise, one should distinguish various uses of dialectic and understand
that he might be distinguishing the nonphilosophical uses of dialectic with the philosophical uses. To

10Eleonore Stump, for instance, sees a topic in the Topics as a strategy for arguing so that the Topics is simply
"a handbook on how to succeed at playing Socrates." (173) So she claims that teaching one to be good at dialectical
disputation is the technë that this handbook wants to teach (viz. Boethius's De topicis differentiis, Cornell University
Press (1978):p. 159-178). J. D. G. Evans also believes that dialectic and ontology have to be sharply distinguished for
Aristotle (viz. Aristotle's Concept o f Dialectic, Cambridge University Press, (1977): p.36). Barnes too says that
Aristotle's Method of endoxa "has, in the last analysis, veiy little content." ("Aristotle and the Methods of Ethics" Rev.
Int. de Phil. vol. 34 (1981): 510). E. Weil in "The Place of Logic in Aristotle's Thought," surprisingly, also agrees with
the Topics' lack of content for he says, "It goes without saying that even topics contains no ultimate criterion of truth.
Topics too is purely formal, in the sense that it applies its procedures indiscriminately to any affirmation: truth depends
on immediate intuition, either perceptual or intellectual." (94) Again, Weil interprets the place of the Topics in
philosophy as "a procedure for discovering the problems—not the solutions—which present themselves to the
philosopher in the course of his daily life." (93) The reason I find such remarks surprising for Weil is that he seems to
recognize the value of the Topics for getting at truth, or extracting truth from common opinions (viz. 97, 99, 103, 107).
Most insightful is his suggestion that one ought to study the relations between topics and ontology. He says, "Now it
is clear that topics and ontology are simply two aspects of one reality: Aristotle says as much himself in one remarkable
chapter (Top. IX 9, 170a20ff); and this is corroborated by the part played in both disciplines by such fundamental notions
as substance, accident, property, genus, and definition." (108) (Articles on Aristotle, vol. 1 eds., Barnes, Schofield and
Sorabji. Duckworth (1975): 88-112)
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emphasize the difference then, he does not use "dialectic" to talk about philosophy in this context.
However, evidence that he is still dealing with philosophical dialectic in this Book, which first eight
chapters deal with the roles played by the good questioner and answerer, is present in VIII.5. That Aristotle
is dealing with philosophical dialectic in Book VIII.5 is clear when he speaks of how there are no rules for
those who use dialectic for the sake of experiment (peiras) and speculation or inquiry (skepseos) whilst the
rules for those who discuss for the sake of didactic, and competitions are clear. (159a25ff) He continues by
saying, "since then, we have no traditions handed down by others, let us try to say something ourselves on
the subject." (159a36-37). Thus he proceeds to provide the rules for being a good answerer in a philosophical
dialectic. More importantly, that the philosopher is ultimately also concerned with being good at questions
and answers so that the initial distinction between the philosopher and the dialectician with respect to their
relations to another party is taken away is evident when Aristotle, in talking about training in dialectic in the
last chapter of Book VIII, talked about the importance of examining the arguments both fo r and against when
dealing with any thesis. Once both sorts of arguments have been laid bare, he spoke of seeking the solution
immediately. Thus he says, "If we have no one else with whom to argue, we must do so with ourselves."
(163a3) Thus even the philosopher plays the part of another party and Aristotle's own dialectical procedures,
just consider Metaphysics Z.13 for a stark example, attest to the importance of arguing against oneself or
playing one's own opponent.11 All these are consistent with Aristotle's talk about the usefulness of dialectic
for philosophical sciences in Book 1.2 when he says, "For the philosophic sciences it is useful, because if we
are able to raise difficulties on both sides, we shall more easily discern both truth and falsehood on every
point." (101a35-36). Such a remark also reminds us of Metaphysics B. 1 when he spoke of the importance
o f knowing the knot and hearing both sides in order to be a good judge and one who is prepared for the
solution. (995a24-995b4) And this is why Aristotle spends the most of the Topics talking about ways of
coming up with constructive and destructive arguments. It is significant that Aristotle talks about both
constructive and destructive arguments because it is only when one could argue for both sides that the mind
could become perplexed and thus more "easily discern both truth and falsehood on every point." (101a36)
Again, it is for the discovery of truth, rather than for the sake of just winning an argument that Aristotle has
in mind in coming up with these materials for arguments.12 (viz. Topics II)
Thus I do not think that the Topics is simply a handbook of strategies that is pure form without any
matter. Contrariwise, the Topics provides us with ways of coming up with arguments, which ways are
intimately bound up with the way the world is and the truth that is accessible through these ways because
these topoi allow us to arrive at definitions. That Aristotle stresses the importance of amassing "an abundance
of material" (163a5) for arguments is not to be undermined. The fact that definitions form a significant role

11E. Weil too recognizes that Aristotle is still dealing with philosophical dialectic in this Book As Weil puts it,
"The dialectical exercise, which has immense philosophical value (for in Aristotle's view the technique of formulating
questions, of finding 'places' for attack and of arranging them in their proper order is common to the philosopher and the
dialectician: Top. VIII 1 155b3ff.) can only be brought to a successful conclusion by a thinker on his own if he plays both
parts: if he cannot find an interlocutor he must raise objections against himself..." Again Weil says, "True
dialectic— topical, peirastic dialectic—is analytic technique used in the examination of a thesis that is commonly
received or otherwise celebrated, an examination that is undertaken as a common task by two or more men in search of
the truth." (99)
l2The fact that Aristotle is concerned to provide both constructive and destructive arguments shows that J. D.
G. Evans is mistaken when he claims that dialectic is different from philosophy because whereas philosophy is scientific,
dialectic is tentative. Dialectic is tentative for Evans because he says that "dialectic can demolish claims to knowledge
but positively it is unable itself to produce knowledge." (12) Given that Aristotle is concerned to provide constructive
arguments shows that dialectic is indeed helpful towards our discerning truth too and not only falsehood. Aristotle deals
explicitly with both constructive and destructive arguments at Book II.3, 4, at the end of 7, and at the beginning of 8 and
9; Book III.6; Book IV. 1-6; Book V.2-9; Book VI.2-13; Book VII. 1-5; just to name a few cases.
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in such materials is evident when he says "(m)oreover, you should have a good supply of definitions and have
those o f familiar and primary ideas ready to hand; for it is by means of these that reasonings are carried on."
(163b20-23) More will be said about definitions shortly. But first, these materials of which he speaks not
only lay bare the problems and make us see clearer what is at stake but they also lead us to philosophical
knowledge. As Aristotle puts it
Also to take and to have taken in at a glance the results of each of two hypotheses is no mean
instrument for the cult of knowledge and philosophic wisdom; for then it only remains to
make a correct choice of one of them. For such a process one must possess a certain natural
ability, and real natural ability consists in being able correctly to choose the true and avoid
the false. (VIII. 15 163b9ff) ‘
Here again, the significance lies in Aristotle's talk of how this method leads to philosophic wisdom and the
choice o f the truth by laying bare the possibilities embedded in the arguments so that one could see clearly
and make a choice of the truth. Dialectic then, as I have already pointed out earlier, aims at the actual facts
or truth and hence it is always already philosophical.
Even more striking than this directedness of dialectic toward truth and being is the importance o f first
principles to dialectic and how dialectic could get at such first principles via definitions. For the relation
between definitions and first principles, see the whole of VIII.3 (158a30-159al4). Let me cite a passage from
VIII.3 regarding definitions and first principles to show the place of such relations for dialectical arguments:
The same hypotheses may be both difficult to attack and easy to defend. Both things which
are by nature primary and things which are by nature ultimate are of this kind. For things
which are primary require definition and things which are ultimate are reached by many
stages if one wishes to establish a continuous train of proof from primary principles, or else
the arguments have the appearance of being sophistical; for it is impossible to demonstrate
anything without starting from the appropriate first principles and keeping up a connected
argument until ultimate first principles are reached. Now those who are being questioned
do not want to give definitions nor do they take any notice if the questioner gives them; and
yet it is difficult to argue if what is proposed is not made clear. This kind of thing is most
likely to happen in the matter of first principles; for, whereas it is through them that
everything else is made clear, they cannot be made clear through anything else, but
everything o f that kind must be made known by definition. (158a30-158b4 my italics.)
It is clear from this passage that arguments regarding things that are primary and ultimate require first
principles which are known by definitions and hence we need to proceed from definitions. But stress on the
universality o f definition comes at the end where he talks about the importance of first principles for making
clear everything and how these first principles are known by definition. Since it is the task of first philosophy
to get at first principles, again, we come to see that dialectic is philosophical for it gets at these first principles
via definitions.13

13Evans notices that the concepts of the same and other, like and unlike, contrariety, priority and posteriority
which are mentioned in the Metaphysics (995b21-2) are "prominent" in the Topics. For instance, he says, "Questions
about whether two things are the same or other are said to fall under the same heading as questions about definition and
are treated in Top. H I-2; and in Top. A7 we are given an analysis of the senses of'sam e1. The notions of similarity and
contrariety provide topics in the discussions of accident, genus, property, and definition....Priority and Posteriority play
an important part in the discussions of property and definition." (38-39) Nonetheless, Evans claims that "no special
emphasis is placed in the Topics on the use of these concepts in dialectic." (39) The detailed discussion of these topics
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Section III
My next task is to show how the topoi are the tools Aristotle uses to determine the four elements.
I have already discussed the significance of sameness and difference as a topos for coming up with definitions
in Section I. (cf. 102a7ff, 103a6ff, and 1.7-10) Let us see what other topoi are available to Aristotle for

in Section III that follows should show how all pervasive the use of these notions is in Aristotle's dialectic.
Another more significant objection Evans raises is that dialectic fails to recognize that "the universal
characters— same etc.—are attributes of Being qua being" and hence fails to treat them in such a way that shows the
primacy of substance. (15) Evans cites Met. K3, 1061b4-l 1 saying that "dialectics and sophistiy deal with the attributes
of existing things, but not of things qua Being, nor do they treat of Being itself in so far as it is Being" to substantiate
his point. This reference, however, is not helpful to Evans for Aristotle recognizes at least three uses of dialectic and
it isn't clear that he is talking about philosophical dialectic in this context, (cf. p.8 of this paper) Besides the "kai" linking
dialectics and sophistry could mean "as" rather than "and" such that the sameness or likeness of the dialectical and the
sophistic practice is being emphasized, (cf. Evans, p. 14n27)
Evans cites another passage in Met. Mu.4 (1078b23-30)
to support his claim that Aristotle's criticism of Socrates' dialectic is that it is too bound up with definitions. Evans says
that Aristotle holds that if Socrates "had practiced dialectic properly, he would not have attempted to make definition
the basis of his reasoning." (25) It is important to note that this passage which Evans cites lies in a context where
Aristotle has just been talking about some of the presocratics and adherents to the theory of forms. It is questionable
if Aristotle meant to dissociate dialectic from definition since in this context, it seemed that he is praising Socrates. For
Aristotle says, "There are two innovations which may fairly be ascribed to Socrates: inductive reasoning and general
definition. Both of these are associated with the starting-point of scientific knowledge." (1078b27-30) So to say that
Socrates is still seeking definitions and hence definitions should be put down and dissociated from dialectic is not a
logical conclusion. After all, how is one to get to first principles if one does not engage in definitions? How is one to
construct arguments if one does not define? For Aristotle says, apart from the passage I just cited from the Topics,
(above) "...it is through definitions that we get to know each particular thing..." (998b5). Even the passage Evans himself
quoted speaks of the importance of definition to logical reasoning. Quoting 1078b24-5, Evans writes "for he was trying
to reason logically, and the starting-point of all logical reasoning is the essence."
M ore importantly, I think that Evans' impression that Aristotle is criticizing Socrates' dialectic stems from
Aristotle's statement that "At that time there was as yet no such proficiency in Dialectic that men could study contraries
independently of the essence and consider whether both contraries come under the same science." (1078b25-27) Evans
took this statement to mean that true dialectic would study contraries independently of essences or definitions. But such
a reading does not seem consistent with Aristotle's immediate criticism of the Idealists who separated definitions and
universals. As Aristotle puts it, "But whereas Socrates regarded neither universals nor definitions as existing in
separation, the Idealists gave them a separate existence, and to these universals and definitions of existing things they
gave the name of Ideas." (1078b30-34) Aristotle's continual criticisms against these adherents to the theory of forms
who separate definitions and universals for the rest of this chapter and the next chapter shows that he is against such
separation. So when he said of Socrates and the other presocratics that they were not proficient enough in dialectic
separate definitions from the essences of existing things, he was just being sarcastic. It was, according to Aristotle, a
good thing that they didn't make such a separation.
Robert Bolton, like Evans, also seeks to undermine the role of definition in Aristotle's Topics. He examines
three types of definition in the Posterior Analytics (143ff) and claims that these three types of definitions are absent from
the Topics (147). Bolton recognizes though, that Aristotle talks about two kinds of definitions in the Topics, namely,
definitions which are made by reference to what is more intelligible to us, and those that are by reference to what is more
intelligible absolutely (141b3ff) But Bolton focuses on Aristotle's rejection of the former as definitions. By saying that
the former should not be the kind of definition at which one aims, however, need not mean a total rejection of this
method. All Aristotle is saying is that the latter is the true definition for which we are looking. So there is not a great
distinction between his downplaying those definitions which are made by reference to what is more intelligible to us,
and the hierarchical ordering of the three types of definition Bolton himself mentions, (viz. "Definition and Scientific
Method in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics and Generation o f Animals" in Philosophical Issues in Aristotle's Biology, eds.,
Gotthelf and Lennox, Cambridge University Press (1987). For the significance of Aristotle's Topics for the
understanding of the Analytics, see E. Weil's "The Place of Logic in Aristotle's Thought."
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coming up with materials for arguments for and against something or for coming up with aporiai essential
for the discovery of truth or being. The detailed discussion of these selected topón are essential to showing
that they are not simply form without content nor are they simply arguments to be consistent with common
opinions or with the appearances that need saving.14 Rather, these detailed expositions serve to show how
each topos and its permutations (a) provide the materials for arguments; (b) generate arguments for and
against certain predications; and, (c) contain the answer one way or another with respect to the four elements
of genus, property, accident, and definition.
Consideration of the topic of greater and less degree, for instance, provides us with four arguments.
In Book II, Aristotle tells us that the first such possible argument from considering greater and less degree
with respect to accidents is to see if the increase in the subject is followed by an increase in the accident. If
this happens, then the accident really belongs to the subject, and if not, then it does not so belong. The second
argument stems from considering the case where one accidental predicate is applied to two subjects. Here,
Aristotle tells us that if this predicate does not belong to the subject to which it is more likely to belong, then
it follows that it also does not belong to that to which it is less likely to belong. On the other hand, if the
predicate is applied to something to which it is less likely to belong, then it is also applied to that to which
it is more likely to belong. The third argument comes from considering two accidental predicates when
applied to one subject. Like the second, if the one subject to which one of the predicates belongs more
generally does not have this accident, it also follows that the predicate which belongs less generally does not
belong. On the other hand, if the less generally belonging accident belongs, then so does the more generally
belonging accident. Finally, the fourth argument stems from considering the case when two predicates are
applied to two subjects. If the predicate that more generally belongs to one of the subjects does not belong,
then neither does the predicate that belongs less generally to its subject belong. Whilst if the predicate that
less generally belongs to its subject belongs, so does the predicate that belongs more generally to its subject
belong. By using these four arguments that stem from considering the greater and the less with respect to
accidents and their frequency in subjects then, Aristotle is able to determine if the accidents under
consideration are accidents of the subjects under consideration. Notice that the topic of the greater and the
less and its permutations not only allows Aristotle to generate materials for arguments, but these arguments
also reveal if a particular accident actually belongs to a subject.
That this topic of the greater and less degree is also used in his consideration of properties is clear
when we look at 137bl4ff-138a29, and its use in his consideration of definitions is evident in 146a3ff and
152b6. Let us look at the greater and less degree in considering properties first. At 137b 14ff Aristotle tells
us that if the greater degree of the predicate fails to be a property of the greater degree of subject, then neither
will the less degree of the predicate be a property of the less degree of the subject and such a negation applies
to the least degree, the greatest degree and to the application of the property to the subject simply Qiaplös).
He gives the example of colour. He says, "since to be more coloured is not a property of what is more a body,
neither would to be less coloured be a property of what is less a body, nor would colour be a property of body
at all." (137b 17-20) This is an instance of a destructive argument. For constructive purposes, one must check

l4Robert Bolton claims that the most that dialectic requires is that one provides an account which is "consistent
with a certain dialectically defensible body of received opinion." Such a procedure, Bolton argues, is different from that
given in the Analytics where one is concerned to provide an explanation of why certain things are true of something
else.(166) Like Cleary and Bolton, M. Nussbaum too is concerned with the preservation of reputable opinions. She
claims that "The method of appearance-saving therefore demands that we press for consistency." (277) (viz. "Saving
Aristotle's Appearances" in Language and Logos, eds., M. Schofield and M. Nussbaum, Cambridge University Press
(1982): 267-293. Though I agree with Nussbaum that we move, for Aristotle, from appearances to giving an account
or a definition, I disagree with her in her reliance on the experts in such accounts. To make it the subject matter of
particular sciences to tell us about reality in general too is to take the activity of searching for this reality out of the hands
of the dialecticians and philosophers and hence to undermine the contribution of dialecticians in the study of
metaphysics.
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if a greater degree of the predicate belongs as a property of a greater degree of the subject. If so, then a less
degree of the predicate will also belong as a property o f a less degree of the subject, and such a belongingness
of predicates to subjects applies to the least degree, the greatest degree, and to the simple belongingness of
the property to the subject. He gives the example of an increase in degree of sensation as a property which
corresponds to an increase in degree of the living thing. Next, for destructive purposes, one could move from
simple predication to the more and the less so that if the predicate simply does not belong as a property to the
subject simply, then neither would the more and the less degree. By reversing this procedure, one comes up
with constructive arguments. That is, if the predicate simply belongs as a property of the subject simply, then
so would such belongingness apply to the greater and less degree. Next, one could see if the more fails to
belong to the more as a property, in which case neither would the less belong. One could reverse this to get
the constructive argument; i.e., if the less belongs as a property of the less, then so would the more. The next
way is to investigate if the property fails to be predicated of that of which it is to a greater degree a property.
If so, then neither would that property be predicated of that of which it is a lesser property. (This one has no
constructive correspondence). Finally, one could see if what is to a greater degree a property of the subject
fails, for then neither would what is to a less degree a property belong. Reversing this, one gets the
constructive argument. That is, if what is to a less degree a property belongs to the subject, then so would
what is to a greater degree. To look at the above arguments in a different way, one could look at the
permutations Aristotle employs with respect to the property and the subject using the topic of the greater and
the less.
1. Increase degree of predicate and increase degree of subject. For destructive arguments, consider failure,
1. e., if the former fails to belong from such an increase, it would fail with increase, decrease, and simply. For
constructive arguments, consider success of predication.
2. Consider simple predication. For destructive arguments, if simple predication fails, so would any variation
in degree. For constructive arguments, if simple predication holds, then so would any variation in degree.
3. Argue from the more to the less and vice versa. If the more does not belong to the more, neither would
the less belong to the less. If the less belongs to the less, so would the more.
4. Argue from the same predicate with respect to different subjects which difference stems from its being
more or less a property of these respective subjects. Argue from the predicate that is to a greater degree a
property o f a subject to this same predicate which is to a less degree a property of another subject. Consider
failure of the greater for destructive arguments. There is no constructive arguments from this topic.
5. Finally, argue from a predicate that is to a greater degree a property of a subject to one which is to a less
degree a property of this same subject. Reverse for constructive argument.
From permutations (1) and (2) above, one can see that simple predication is intimately bound up with
variation in degrees when it comes to predicating a property of a subject. Hence, by considering such
variations in degree of subjects and predicates, one can test if what is asserted to be a property is indeed a
property o f the subject. The more and the less then, is a topos which Aristotle has gotten from the world
because it is commonly admitted by everyone that there is more and less to things and their predicates in this
world, and this is admitted because it is a fact of this world. Such a topos of varying the more and the less
of the subject and the predicate and seeing if the predication still holds when it comes to the elements of
accidents and properties as we have seen, enables Aristotle to determine the reality of these accidents and
properties with respect to their subjects.
Let us next consider the use of the topic of the more and the less in definitions by looking at 146a3ff.
At 146a3ff, Aristotle tells us to see if the variation in degree (namely, an increase in degree) of the subject
that is being defined matches that o f the terms of the description. If the subject being defined is the same as
the terms of the description, then either both must admit of the variation or neither. The next test consists in
seeing if both the subject and the terms of the description admit of a greater degree whilst the increase in
degree does not happen at the same time. This is because if they are the same, such an increase should
happen at the same time. (cf. 152b5-9) Another way of employing the greater and less degree in definition
is to see if the subject of the definition "applies in a greater degree" whilst "what is assigned by the definition
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applies in a less degree" when one is considering alternative propositions for the definition (146al3-15). He
gives the example of fire and how the definition of fire as 'a body consisting of the most subtle parts' is more
suitable for light and less so for flame. If then, the definition given is the same as the subject defined, the
definition and the subject ought to have the same increase in degree. In short, a greater degree ought to apply
similarly to the subject and the terms proposed such that if the greater degree were to apply to the one and
not the other, then the definition is not the same as the subject defined. Here again, one sees how the greater
and the less as a topos helps Aristotle to determine if the definition given is the same as the subject defined.
The next topos which we might consider is that of contraries. In Book II for instance, Aristotle talks
about dealing with someone who claims that "the knowledge of opposites is the same." (viz. 109bl3-b29)
In such a case, he says that we must examine the knowledge of: relative opposites, such as the double and
the half; contraries and predicates that deal with privation and presence, such as blindness and sight; and
contradictory predicates such as being and not-being. In examining these kinds of oppositions which fall
under the aforementioned species instead of examining every single opposite, Aristotle thinks that we could
determine the truth or falsity of the claim that knowledge of opposites is the same. This is because if we are
to discover that the knowledge of any one of these opposites is not the same, then the claim is destroyed. On
the other hand, if we find that this predication about the sameness of knowledge of opposites applies to all
cases, then it is true. This discussion not only shows that the topic of contraries supplies us with materials
for arguments, but it also shows that the topics of opposition, relative opposition, and contradictions are also
useful in the investigations regarding claims to knowledge such as this one. Another topos that is also
revealed in this discussion is that of investigating something within a class or species rather than through the
infinite instances of such a thing. I will say more about this topic of generating materials for arguments
through classifications (i.e., part-whole relations) shortly—for the talk of one class containing another and
the predicates of the one belonging or not belonging to the other have their own permutations which generate
materials for arguments.
Having seen one instance of how the topic of contraries contribute to the generation of materials for
arguments about accidents, let us look at some other cases where contraries could generate materials for
arguments. In Book II.7 112b26-l 13al4 Aristotle shows how it is that there are six ways of combining
contraries and that four of these combinations give us a contrariety. He then shows that since there are two
contraries to the same thing, we should pick whichever is more useful for the thesis. More specifically, the
six combinations for contraries are:
(1) Combining each of the contrary verbs with each of the contrary objects and doing this in two ways. E.g.,
doing good to friends and doing harm to enemies, or vice versa.
(2) Combining the contrary verbs with one object and again, doing this in two ways. E.g., doing good to
friends and doing harm to friends, or doing good to enemies and doing harm to enemies.
(3) Finally, using one verb with the two contrary objects and again, doing this in two ways. E.g., doing good
to friends and doing good to enemies, or doing harm to friends and doing harm to enemies.
He explains that the first two combinations do not produce contrarieties because doing good to friends
is not the contrary of doing harm to enemies since both of these are choiceworthy actions and hence they are
the same in character. The same applies to the converse since the converse results in both actions being
actions to be avoided. The last four combinations however, do produce contrarieties. E.g., in the first way
of combination (2), doing good to friends and doing harm to friends are contraries for the first act is to be
pursued whilst the second is to be avoided. From these discussions, Aristotle shows that "the same thing has
in fact more than one contrary. For 'to do good to friends' has as its contrary both 'to do good to enemies' and
'to do harm to friends'." (113a 15-17) Consequently, depending on the case, one of these contraries might be
more useful than the other. That two contraries are available for something allows Aristotle to use contraries
to generate materials for coming up with arguments which are for and against a case and hence generate
aporiai. These aporiai, as I have already pointed out above, help one to ascertain the definition of something
because each argument actually gets us a step closer to the essence or definition by getting us the true
accident, or property, or genus, or definition.
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Another way in which Aristotle uses the topic of contrary to examine if an accident is indeed the
accident of a subject is by looking at the contrary of the accident if there is one. One must then see whether
this contrary of the accident also belongs to the same subject to which the accident belongs. For if this
contrary of the accident belongs, then the accident cannot belong for it is impossible for "two contraries to
belong to the same thing at the same time." (113a23) Since such a way of employing the topic of contrary
could test if an accident is truly an accident, it is indirectly important to the discovery of a thing's definition
as I have shown in Section I.
Another way in which the contrary topic is useful in ascertaining the being of a thing is to look to see
if whatever is said of the thing might lead this thing to have contrary predicates. For instance, if one were
to say that "ideas exist in us," "it will follow that they are both in motion and at rest, and ... they are objects
both of sensation and thought." So the presence of contrary predicates will determine if the assertion
regarding the thing is false. (113a24-33) Finally, another way of using the contrary topic is to see if the
accident and its contrary can belong to the same faculty (class or category are plausible too) if they are
contraries which fall within the same faculty. For instance, if hatred is said to follow anger, then hatred
would belong to the spirited faculty since anger is in this faculty. We are then to investigate if the contraiy
o f hatred, namely, friendship, also belongs to this faculty for such contraries ought to fall under the same
faculty. If friendship is not in the spirited faculty but rather falls in the appetitive faculty, then it is wrong
to say that hatred follows anger. By the same token, Aristotle gives the example of claiming that the
appetitive faculty is ignorant. Since what is ignorant can also have knowledge, it follows that the appetitive
faculty is knowledgeable. But this is not true for "it is not a generally accepted opinion that the appetitive
faculty is capable of knowledge," (viz. 113b4-7) hence it is not true to say that the appetitive faculty is
ignorant.
The contrary topic is used in the investigation of a property in the following way. If one of a pair of
contrary is not a property of one of another pair of contrary, then neither will the other of the first pair be a
property of the other of the second pair of contrary. For contrary subjects consider justice and injustice. For
contrary terms consider the greatest good and the greatest evil. If then, the greatest good is not a property
o f justice, then neither will the greatest evil be a property of injustice. By reversing the consideration from
not being a property to being a property above will give us the constructive argument for a property. This
same employment of the topic of contrary for destructive and constructive arguments is applicable to dealing
with relative opposites such as double and half, and exceeding and exceeded too.
Use of the contraiy topic in Book VI concerning definitions of terms is as follows. Aristotle says that
the contrary description of the conjunction of terms ought to describe the contrary term. For instance, if
'beneficial' is said to be 'productive of good,' then 'harmful' is 'productive of evil' or 'destructive of good.' If
neither of these contrary terms is the contrary of the original term, then neither are the descriptions later and
earlier correct. (147a3 3-147b3) Another use of the contrary topic in definitions consists in those which derive
their names from the privation of a contrary. These derivative terms are to be defined by their contraries.
But Aristotle warns that "the other contrary cannot then be defined by means of the contrary whose name
takes the form of a privation; for then the result would be that each was known through the other." (147b5-10)
Another use of the contrary topic is when something which does not have a contrary (such as flesh and bone),
is simply defined as something with a contrary (e.g., composition which contrary is decomposition)(151a2428). In this case, it is clear that the definition offered is not correct or adequate and the use of the contrary
topic helps establish this. A final way in which talk of contrary could help establish that a proposed definition
is inadequate is this. When something which is open to both contraries gets defined only in terms o f one of
them, it is clear that the definition is inadequate.
Next, let us consider the use of the part-whole topic. Like the last use of the contrary where both
contraries belong to something but only one gets mentioned, the part-whole topic works in definitions to
identify the error of a definition which mentions parts but not the whole. As Aristotle puts it, "you must see
whether, though the term which is being defined applies to a number of things, your opponent has failed to
apply it to all of them," (142b30-33) e.g., only to mention writing from dictation to define grammar and not
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mention reading is to include only a part and not the whole in the definition. An
whole works is this. When defining a complex term, Aristotle suggests that we take
wa^ *n
one part o f the whole and see if the remaining description in the definition matche avvay the description of
not, then neither does the whole definition describe the whole. (148b23-26) By ^
remaining parts. If
in which part-whole works is by looking at the compound being defined and s e e i n g t ° k en>another way
contains the same number o f parts as the parts o f the whole being defined.
A e th e r the description
A t 150aff, Aristotle discusses extensively the problems we could generate ancj
dealing with definitions that are formulated in the form of conjunctions o f parts. p0r ^ ° uld cons^ e r when
to defining something as (1) A and B, Aristotle shows that such a definition will end Instance>
resPect
to neither. This is due to the fact that each o f these parts might have other parts that
*° ^0^ ^
other. Thus if one were to define justice as 'temperance and courage,' although one**^ * contra^ ct eac^
temperance whilst another possess courage so that taken together they possess justice ^ CrSOr?
Poss^ ss
o f them by himself is just. Furthermore the first person may possess temperance and co ^ 6 ess’ !*eith^ r
second possess justice and incontinence. In this case, taken together, they will have justice and 106 W S ·1 6
injustice is the opposite o f temperance and courage, i.e., incontinence and cowardice ΐ π ^ mJ^st*cesm ^e
tells us that any argument that could prove that the parts are not the same as the whole ,, n ?ra ’ ■ nS ° ?
, ~
c IS useful against such
a definition.
b
In considering a definition that states that something is (2) "made up o f A and B " Aristotle sa s that
(i) we must consider the parts and see i f it is unnatural for them to unite to form a single product^E? a
number and a line can never join to form anything. Aristotle says, "for some things are so Constituted in
relation to one another that nothing can come into being from them." (150a 25) (H) p fe next cons¡¿era(¡on
is to see i f what is defined comes into being in a single thing whilst the parts do not come to be in a single
thing but each in something different, (iii) I f the parts and the whole, however, both exist in some single
thing, then we should see i f they exist in the same thing or not; for it is possible for the whole to exist in one
thing and the parts in another, (iv) Next, we should see when the parts and whole perish; whether they do
so at the same time or the parts perish when the whole does, or the whole perishes when the parts do or the
whole perishes but the parts do not. Aristotle thinks that the whole will perish when the parts do but the parts
need not perish when the whole does, (v) Apply the good and bad and see i f the whole is good or bad whilst
the parts aren't, or the converse. And he states that "it is impossible that anything either good or bad should
come into being from something which is neither, or anything which is neither from things which are good
or bad. " (150b 1-2) (vi) Another point is to see if one of the things has more good than the other has evil, and
nonetheless, the product has not more good than evil, (vii) But it is also possible that (vi) is not so for things
might not be good in themselves, but when combined, produce good, or the converse (e.g., drugs), (viii) The
combination o f the better and worse is considered in the same light as (vi) and (vii). (ix) Consider i f the
whole is synonymous with one o f the parts, for this must not be the case, (x) See i f the way in which these
parts are combined have not been stated. For the way in which things are combined make them one thing
rather than another.
Aristotle next considers the definition stated in the form o f (3) "A plus B." I f the "plus" means "and"
or "made up of," then any o f the aforementioned arguments could be used. Next, consider i f the 'plus' means
that they are in the same place or time, or are contained in an identical receptacle, whilst such are inapplicable
to A and B, then such cannot be the proper defmition o f the thing, i f however, A and B can exist at the same
time, check to see i f they can be in different relations. I f they could, then one does not have the correct
definition (e.g., courage in robbeiy and right opinion about health matters). Even i f they are used in the same
relation (say health matters), i f it isn't the right one, but any chance relation, the definition is still incorrect.
As he puts it, "For each must be related neither to some different object nor to some chance object which is
identical, but to the true function o f courage, for example, facing the dangers o f war or anything which is a
still more characteristic function of courage. (15 la 10-14)
Another extensive use o f the part-whole topic is present in Aristotle's talk o f the genus, species and
differentia. Aristotle's view is that the genus is the most widely predicated or the most encompassing o f these
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elements. (144a30-32) Considering the genus as a whole then, being wider than the species, it is necessary
that the species can admit the definition of the genus but not vice versa. (121al2-14) This topos allows us
to check whether the genus that is proposed can be predicated of the species and whether the species can be
predicated o f the genus. For instance, if one were to propose X as the genus of 'being' or of 'oneness', what
would happen is that the definition of the species (being or oneness) will end up being predicated of the genus
since everything that exists is one and is being. In this way, the species would violate the fact that it is
narrower in scope than the genus. Not only this, but to have being or oneness as a species means that there
must be another species that is the species of non-being and non-unity. Since this is impossible, it is absurd
to have something that is common to all things such as being and oneness be the species and have a genus
of these.
Another use of the part-whole topic to show that the genus or the differentia cannot be one of these
attributes that is common to everything is given at 127a25ff. Like the muddling of the species and the genus
as before, the result of making a common attribute the genus of everything is another muddling of these two
kinds of definitions which are supposed to be different in scope. If being were to be a genus, it would be the
genus o f everything since it is predicated of everything. But the genus is not to be predicated of everything
but its species for Aristotle, otherwise there would not be any distinction into genus and species. Even
oneness would be a species of being if being is the genus since oneness, too, is being. Accordingly, the
species also ends up being predicated of everything and hence has the same scope as being or the genus. With
respect to the differentia too, Aristotle maintains that if such a common attribute were to be a differentia, it
would be predicated as widely as the genus, if not more widely. It would be predicated more widely than the
genus if the genus is not also one of these common attributes and hence is predicated also of everything.15
The part-whole topos is used again to test the correctness of the assigned species by seeing if the
genus is only partially predicated of the species. As Aristotle puts it, "for it is generally held that genus is
not partially imparted; for a man is not merely partially an animal nor is the science of grammar partially
knowledge, and so likewise in the other instances." (126a 19-20) Likewise, if the genus is only captured in
part, such a definition is mistaken. E.g., if animal were defined as being only an 'object of sensation' or
'object of sight.' Since such a definition does not include the part that is the soul, it is partial and hence
incorrect. (126a20-24) Again, Aristotle points out that if one were to mistake the part for the whole, one
would end up with the wrong genus. E.g., if one were to say that animal is 'animated body'. Since the part
is not predicable of the whole, one would be wrong to think of the genus as this part. (126a25-29)
From these part-whole considerations, one is able to test the proposed species, differentia, and genus.
Since these are all essential elements to a definition, they again aid in our knowledge of definitions for
Aristotle. Most importantly, the topos of part-whole which allows us to make such arguments to establish
the true status of these elements does not lie within Aristotle's definitions of these elements. Hence, using
the arguments generated from this topou to test these elements is not circular. Furthermore, the understanding
and agreement of the part-whole topic is a common opinion because it is a part of reality and hence it
constitutes the way in which we think about reality. Nonetheless, such an opinion, is more primitive than
many other more developed opinions which express one's established views about certain matters, say, about
the first principles or causes. These opinions which express more developed views by everyone or the many
and the wise have been discussed by most commentators. The more primitive opinions which are our
opinions about things or aspects of reality that are simple are my focus. Due to the primitive nature of these
topón such as part-whole, greater and less, contraries etc., and the fact that Aristotle thinks that we are never
mistaken when it comes to such simple things (viz. Metaphysics 1051b23-33), employing these elements as
materials to generate arguments allow us to get at the truth or the facts without begging the question.*17

,5For the wider scope of differentia when compared to the species see 144b5-7. Hence the differentia is to be
predicated of the species but the species is not predicated of the differentia. For the impossibility of predicating the
genus of the differentia, see 144a32-144b3.
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Furthermore, the number of arguments that one could come up with from the permutations within each of
these topón as well as from the permutations available by combining the various topois, enable Aristotle to
come up with tests for each of the elements and their contributions to definitions in ways that are far from
being restricted to one's established common opinions. And this is precisely the reason why Aristotle stresses
the usefulness of an abundance of materials for arguments. Such an abundance of materials for arguments
and hence the abundance of arguments for and against a certain view lets us examine an opinion far beyond
just trying to preserve such an opinion.
Let us next consider the topos of "better than" or superiority. This topos is concerned to compare
things that are closely related (sunengus) such as: the more permanent and the less; that which is desired for
its own sake (or ends) and that which is desired for something else (or means); the per se cause of good and
the accidental cause of good; the absolute and the individual good; the better consequence of two or more
things; the preferable with respect to time; self-sufficiency and dependency; and many others. Aristotle
believes that oftentimes we cannot see which of these things being compared is superior. But once it is made
clear or shown (<deikteisës) which is superior, we will choose that which is superior.1617
Using the topos of the greater and the less for instance, Aristotle argues that more good things are
better than less. Such a superiority could be either absolute or when one is included in the other, for instance,
when the less is included in the greater. Nonetheless, he combines topoi and makes a case for how something
that is desired for its own sake cannot even be superseded by taking together a greater number of things which
are desired for the sake of this thing that is desired for its own sake. For instance, to become healthy plus
health is not better than health itself since health is the end at which one aims when one chooses to become
healthy. Again, using the greater and the less combined with consideration of consequences, Aristotle claims
that there is nothing to prevent something that is not good from being more choiceworthy than that which is
good. This happens when the thing that is not good is added to something that is better than the other good
thing plus another good thing. E.g., when something not good is added to happiness, it is better than justice
plus courage.17 Finally, Aristotle speaks of how the same thing is more choiceworthy when it is accompanied
by pleasure and freedom from pain. (viz. 117a 15-25)
Using time as another topos, Aristotle is able to argue for the superiority of one óf these two or more
closely related things. He claims that which is more useful on every occasion is better than that which is
sometimes useful. (117a35-37) Likewise, that which persists through time or is more permanent is superior
to that which is fleeting. ( 116al3) Using time again, he argues for the choiceworthiness of certain things
when it is most important to that time. E.g., to be free from pain when one is old. is to be preferred to this
freedom from pain when one is young for one is more prone to be troubled by pain in old age. Likewise, selfcontrol is preferable when one is young rather than when one is old because the young is more troubled by
passions and hence is more in need of self-control.18 (117a25-34)

16Such a claim which Aristotle makes at the beginning of Topics III shows very clearly the error of those who
think that the Topics is simply pure form without content, or that it is incapable of supplying us with truth. Thus Evans'
claim that "dialectic is essentially neutral with regard to the truth in any matter and is concerned rather to test the merits
of both sides of a case without finally pronouncing on which side has the greater merit" (34) directly contradicts
Aristotle's statement here.
17For more use of the topic of consequences in general, see 116b5-15.
18For the use of time as a topic in Book VI see 145b21ff, and 150b35ff, in Book V see 134a5ff.

18

Conclusion
Most commentators think that arguing dialectically for Aristotle means arguing from common
opinions that are somehow already established views about the way something is, or about actions to be taken
or avoided so that there is a problem of how one is to discover objective truths that may lie beyond what is
given in these opinions19. My reading of dialectic—especially philosophical dialectic—in Aristotle does the
following. I read dialectic as being concerned to come up with the materials for arguments. These materials
are not always already opinions that support one's developed presuppositions as I have described above.
Rather, some of these materials are prior to such opinions which form the well established views about certain
matters which some take common opinions to be. I think that even prior to these views, which also constitute
the arguments are opinions about certain topics which topics are derived from aspects of reality and reality
itself. These topoi then aid in the determination of the correct four elements which in turn are all directed at
definition. Apart from the four elements, these topón also help establish materials for arguments in such a
way that the truth or falsity of a certain argument is laid bare. My extended discussion of the examples of
the way in which each topic applies to each of, or some of, the four elements hopefully have shown how it
is that the arguments that are derived from these topics do not just generate arguments without any clues as
to the truth or falsity of these arguments. Rather, the arguments that are generated from these topics actually
allow us to determine within each argument, what the reality of each of the four elements is. Hence within
the materials for arguments themselves are already tests which allow us to test the way reality is because
reality itself structures these topics, making them the means to determining if reality is one way or another.
By using these topoi in his dialectical procedure to generate materials for arguments, which arguments in
addition are aporetic in nature, in the sense that Aristotle is always concerned to argue for and against a
certain matter, one is also given the means with which to determine if the four elements are true of reality for
these topoi limit the possibilities of the assertions and make certain definitions true and others not true. These
topoi limit the possibilities of definitions because they are from reality or being which itself is limited and
structured so that when one tries to capture reality or being in a definition by using these topics, what one gets
is a definite definition.
So instead of the oft-claimed view that Aristotle's Topics only provides us with form and no content,
I think that the topics do present us with content in the sense that it is bound up with a certain ontology or
view o f the world. The world is so structured that these topics exist as reality or as aspects of reality. For
instance, that there is the greater and less, contraries, the one and the many, the better and the worse, the prior
and the posterior, part and whole, things that are absolute {hath' auto) and non-absolute or accidental, means
and ends, things permanent and fleeting, independent and dependent, and things that are necessary, by chance,
or usually the case. Far from limiting our investigations to certain common opinions then, these primitive
common opinions, i.e., the topics, and their permutations actually open up all the possibilities which are to
be investigated. In addition to opinions that are common and generally agreed upon then, arguing
dialectically for Aristotle in my view is always already philosophical because it is concerned with the same
kinds of subject matter as philosophy for it is always using materials that get at the way the world is (i.e., the
materials supplied by the topics) and hence is a method that is always already bound up with the way the
world really is. If then the world is structured hierarchically so that there is a primary substance which forms
the focus of all other substances, dialectic working through the tools of the topics will reveal this fact. It is
important to note that many of these opinions, if they are not common, are at least about certain things, or
aspects o f things and actions that are common to everyone. That is, they are not about things that are totally
alien, nor need they be about things that everyone agrees beyond the agreement that there is something there
to be determined. It is the very fact that not everyone agrees about the state of the matter beyond agreeing
that there is something there that Aristotle needs to come up with the materials for arguments for and against

19Bames, Bolton and Evans all perceive this as a problem in Aristotle's dialectic.
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what the thing is. So the point in the opening paragraph of Book III applies analogically to the rest of the
Topics by being applied to the opinions that we may have about something so that the arguments we come
up with are for determining which of these closely related opinions, in the sense that they are either about the
same thing or some aspect of the thing, is the true one.
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